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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses why we need theory and metrics of technology upgrading. It critically 
reviews the existing approaches to technology upgrading and motivates build-up of 
theoretically relevant but empirically grounded middle level conceptual and statistical 
framework which could illuminate a type of challenges relevant for economies at different 
income levels. It conceptualizes technology upgrading as three dimensional processes 
composed of intensity and different types of technology upgrading through various types of 
innovation and technology activities; broadening of technology upgrading through different 
forms of technology and knowledge diversification, and interaction with global economy 
through knowledge import, adoption and exchange. We consider this to be necessary first 
step towards theory and metrics of technology upgrading and generation of more relevant 
composite indicator of technology upgrading. 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Why do we need theory of technology upgrading? There are three major factors that 
motivate this paper. First, search for universal factors of growth is futile (see Easterly, 2001). 
Theories of aggregate economic growth are concerned most often by single variable or 
factors that can explain economic growth. Seeking for universal theory or single set of 
factors that can explain growth at different levels of development and in different 
geographical areas is faced with huge empirical and methodological challenges. Equally, 
technology is one of the major drivers of growth in long-term is no reducible to single 
variable be it R&D or total factor productivity (TFP) (Lee, 2012). The improvements in 
technological capability arise from increased investments across a number of the drivers of 
technology upgrading (Furman and Hayes, 2004). The challenge is to figure out which 
drivers (if any), are common and which are country-specific. Also, drivers differ over the 
course of development and thus may be quite different for low income, middle and high-
income economies. Second, current metrices of technological upgrading are either 
atheoretical or not rooted in stylized facts of technology upgrading and thus not relevant to 
low/middle income economies1. For example, Global Innovation Index and the EU 
Innovation Union Scoreboard (IUS) are pragmatic but atheoretical analytical frameworks.  
By this we mean that they do  not have underlying understand of how technology upgrading 
takes places across different income levels. Currently popular Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse 
or CDM model (1998) brings together into a simple framework relationship between R&D, 
innovation and productivity and thus gives impression that it is theoretically grounded.   
However, we consider it of limited relevance for countries that operate behind technology 
frontier as it is based on R&D as inputs into innovation process which makes it of limited 
relevance for low and middle income economies. World Economic Forum Global 
Competiveness Report recognizes differences in drivers of growth which makes it 
theoretically and empirically grounded but its approach is mixing technological and 
institutional variables which we consider quite problematic (see below). Third, theoretically 
grounded but not measurable framework is of quite limited value. Equally metrics that is 
not grounded in stylized facts or theory is of limited value. Moreover, such metrices can 
lead to irrelevant policies as it focuses users on issues which are not directly relevant to 
their growth challenges. A paradigmatic example for this issue is the contradiction in the 
current EU approach between its dominant metrics (cf. IUS) which assumes identical 
technological paths and drivers of growth and the wish to push countries along divergent 
‘smart specialization’ paths. The EU is pushing countries and regions to embark on process 
of formulating their smart specialization strategies to avoid so called ‘adding up’ problem 
(Spence 2011: 94-96) or situation that too many regions are aiming for similar technologies 
and markets and thus competing each other out. However, its dominant metrics (IUS) which 
countries and regions are using as policy targets is actually reinforcing imitative policies 
towards R&D based growth. So, in outcome we have situation that metrics determines 
policy instead of policy determining metrics. 
 
                                                          
1
 Our notion of middle income economies does not strictly correspond to World Bank classification which we 
consider outdated. A more accurate definition should include into this category not only currently classified 
middle income economies (from $1K- $12K pc) but also ‘lower’ high income economies  ($12K - $30K) as 
opposed to  opposed to ‘upper’ high income economies (above $30K per capita).  
Based on these three motivating factors we argue that there is need to generate 
theoretically relevant but empirically grounded middle level conceptual and statistical 
framework which could illuminate a type of challenges which seem relevant for a large 
number in World Bank classification of middle income and ‘lower’ high income countries 
(from $1K - $30K pc) in their path out of potential middle-income trap. In order to avoid 
measurement without (some) theory or at least grounding of metrics in stylized facts of 
technology upgrading  we think that there is need to construct composite indicator of 
technology upgrading, which can complement the existing metrices, especially IUS, and 
which would reflect better different drivers and patterns of technology upgrading in broadly 
defined middle income economies. 
 
Our aim is not to use technology upgrading as substitute for economic growth but as one of 
the major determinants of economic growth. We recognise that some countries can grow to 
high-income levels without much consideration being given to technology capability. For 
example, resource based economies and entrepot economies can reach high incomes 
without necessarily being innovators. Also, economies can reach various income levels 
based on a variety of institutional systems. From perspective of technology upgrading we 
are concerned primarily with technology accumulation issues. We assume that very 
different institutional systems can lead to technology upgrading or that institutional forms 
are secondary to processes of technology accumulation. Similar to functional views on 
innovation systems we are primarily concerned with technology activities that increase firm, 
sector and country level capabilities. Institutional context is quite important variable which 
in the end is necessary to explain country different performances in growth but our primary 
concern is with technology upgrading as an issue of accumulation of technology capabilities 
at different levels.  
 
In the rest of this paper we discuss the issue of technology upgrading in the context of 
broader literature on technology upgrading. Then we explain our conceptual framework and 
its assumptions which we propose as a way forward in theorizing and measuring technology 
upgrading. Conclusions summarize the major points.  
 
 
2. PAST AND CURRENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO RESEARCH ON 
TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING 
 
2.1 Past and recent contributions 
 
Thinking about growth from upgrading perspective is not of recent origin. Marshall in the 
Principles of Economics (1890) recognised big differences in the dynamics among different 
economic sectors that have important aggregate effects on growth of economy. 
Schumpeter’s theory of "Business Cycles" is firmly rooted in analysis of the emergence and 
decline of leading industries that in aggregate lead to macroeconomic cycles. Simon Kuznets 
in "Secular, Movements in Prices and Production" (1930) recognised that shifts in the 
relative importance of leading industries follow life cycles pattern in terms of sales and 
innovations.  Chenery and Syrquin (1975) in "Patterns of development 1950-70" analysed 
the structural characteristics of the economy by grouping industries in early, middle and late 
ones. The idea of development as evolving process that goes through several stages was 
first formulated by Rostow (1960) in his stages of growth model. This thinking is based on 
the idea of industry life cycle and ‘leading sectors’, which drive growth of economies in 
specific stages. A common feature of these modes is assumption that “all nations going 
through the same stages in the same order, though not necessarily at the same times” (von 
Tunzelmann 1995:69). A similar logic of structural change but in international context has 
been conceptualized based on Japanese experience as ‘Flying-geese model’ by Akamatsu 
(1962). This model depicts changing patterns of industry specialization based on import – 
domestic production – export sequencing which induces structural change in both leader 
and follower countries. Countries also exhibit similarities in terms of a sequence of 
structural changes in industrial development not only in the order of ‘capital goods 
following consumer goods’ but also ‘in the progression from crude to simple goods to 
complex and refined goods’. This is accompanied by a sequential positioning of the 
developing countries that are lined up behind the advanced nations so that the former can 
emulate, learn from and capitalise on growth stimuli/externalities via economic 
interactions. A latest example of this type of thinking about growth is a structural stages 
model of growth of Ozawa (2009) which represents a synthesis of stage theories of growth 
(i.e. Rostow and Akamatsu) and Schumpeter. This model is based on the actual historical 
path of industrial (hence technological) development (i.e. the ladder of economic 
development) which is driven by innovations. The outcome is synthesized into a sequential 
growth in five stages with a leading-sector in each stage. Ozawa’s stylization of Japan’s 
industry upgrading is along the following sequence: Labour-driven industries → scale-driven 
→ assembly-driven → R&D-driven → IT-driven. This and previous contributions are largely 
based in history and thus chart map of upgrading which is based on the historical experience 
of the leading economies. This is their strength but also weakness as catching up country 
may not necessarily follow the pattern of leaders as shown by Lee (2013). 
 
The alignment of countries in the process of industrial upgrading has been widely 
recognised as “countries gradually move up in technological development by following the 
pattern of countries just ahead of them in the development process” (Radelet and Sachs 
1997: 52). This line of thinking has been rejuvenated in the form of new structural 
economics of Justin Yifu Lin. The idea is that economic development is ‘a process of 
continuous industrial and technological upgrading in which any country, regardless of its 
level of development, can succeed if it develops industries that are consistent with its 
comparative advantage, determined by its endowment structure. The successful strategy for 
developing countries is to exploit the late-comer advantage by building up industries that are 
growing dynamically in more advanced countries that have endowment structures similar to 
theirs’. (Lin, 2011:4). So, implicit in ideas of new structural economics is the process of 
technology upgrading which should be based on country’s ‘latent comparative advantages’.  
The econometric evidence for this proposition is quite persuasive and has been tested also 
in the context of transition economies (Bruno et al, forthcoming). However, this approach 
seems largely applicable in transformation from low to middle income levels but seemingly 
less in transition from middle-income to high income. A very important contribution by Lee 
(2013) is quite persuasive account of transformation from middle income to high-income 
status and it clearly shows the role of structural change, especially technological 
diversification as one of the major factors of catching up. While new structural economics 
accounts (Lin 2012a, 2012b, 2012c) show paths of technology upgrading by ‘copying 
industries’ based on latent comparative advantages in transition from low to middle income 
levels Lee (2013) shows middle income economies taking ‘detour’ or their own path in 
transition from middle to high income. A very recent contribution to our thinking about 
technology upgrading in the context of technology specialization and growth is Foray (2015) 
contribution to conceptually frame and theorize issues based on smart specialization 
strategies of the EU.  
 
The major recent push to our understanding of technology upgrading came from exploring 
upgrading which takes place through global value chains. Within this literature industrial 
upgrading is defined as substantial changes in a country’s specialisation and knowledge base 
that increase its capacity for value generation (Ernst 1998). Gereffi (1999: 51-2) defines it as 
“a process of improving the ability of a firm or an economy to move to more profitable 
and/or technologically sophisticated capital and skill-intensive economic niches”. Upgrading 
is usually defined as a process of gradual shift from lower to higher value-added activities; 
e.g., from cheap and simple products to complex and expensive ones; from mass production 
of standardised products to flexible production of differentiated products; and, from simple 
assembly to more integrated forms of production (such as OEM, ODM and OBM). A 
hierarchy is common feature of taxonomies of upgrading (as seen in the Table 1, particularly 
in Gereffi and Ernst). Some of taxonomies are theory driven (Gereffi 1998 and Ernst 2001) 
and some are the outcome of empirical work conducted at the firm level (firm based case 
studies) (Hobday 1995, Humphrey and Schmitz 2004). 
 
 
Table 1: Taxonomies of firm level upgrading in international (GVC) context 
 
Authors Taxonomy / Trajectory Locus of upgrading 
Hobday (1995) Original Equipment 
Manufacturing (OEM) 
Original Design Manufacturing 
(ODM) 
Original Brand Manufacturing 
(OBM) 
International production networks  
Gereffi (1998) within  
-factories,  
-inter-firm networks,   
-local or national economies, 
and 
-supranational macro-regions 
Global value chains 
Ernst (2001) hierarchy of  
-industries, 
-factors of production,  
-consumption,  
-value chain stages 
-forward and backward 
linkages  
Global production networks (2001, 
2006),  
Global knowledge networks (2008),  
Global innovation networks (2009) 
Humphrey and 
Schmitz (2004) 
Process upgrading  
Product upgrading 
Functional upgrading 
Inter-sectoral upgrading 
Global value chains 
 
It is not surprising that today technology upgrading is most often discussed in international 
context.  Ernst (1997) and Gereffi (1999) are pioneers that initiated the analysis of upgrading 
via global production networks (GPNs) and the global value chains (GVC) framework. 
However, as shown by Yoruk (2013) upgrading today is unjustifiably narrowed down to 
upgrading within value chains or GPN. In a first in-depth study of technology upgrading 
through value chains in the Central and Eastern Europe context, she shows the major 
importance of not only production networks but also knowledge networks. In fact, her 
research shows that learning by doing and learning by exporting do not have statistically 
significant effect on functional upgrading. She shows that opportunities offered by GVCs will 
be of little use unless firms have ability to internalise this external knowledge through its 
human resources, through training and research within the firm. She also shows that 
managerial upgrading is important to technology upgrading but global buyers do not 
support it. This highlights the importance of organisational capabilities and suggests that the 
firms’ structure is important structural dimension of technology upgrading.  
 
What are relevant insights from these contributions for understanding theory and metrics of 
technology upgrading? First, past contributions are largely qualitative insights, which have 
not been converted into models or stylizations of technology upgrading of countries. Also, 
contributions by Rostow and Chenery have not been followed by attempts to extend them 
and apply in a new context. Yet, past contributions share common assumption of some kind 
of similar or identical path of upgrading. In the light of recent contributions, especially Lee 
(2013) and Foray (2015) this assumption would need to be qualified or significantly relaxed, 
especially path of transition from middle to high income. So, ‘copying industries’ may work 
in transition from low to middle-income (Lin, 2012b) but diversity and variety of upgrading 
paths are much more present in subsequent stages. Second, technology upgrading is an 
interactive process between ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’ (Akamatsu, 1962). A literature on GVC 
clearly shows the overwhelming importance of international context of upgrading but also 
its limits (Yoruk, 2013). Third, variety of contributions on technology upgrading show that 
upgrading is multi-level process taking place at firm, industry, inter-industry and country 
levels. In continuation, we expand on this important feature of technology upgrading.  
 
2.2. Multi-level perspectives on technology upgrading 
 
As we show below literature suggests that upgrading is multi-level phenomenon operating 
at firm, industry and country level (see Table 2 for summary).  
  
Table 2: Different perspectives on technology upgrading  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Innovation 
studies 
scholars 
have been 
concerned 
with 
technology 
upgrading 
at firm 
level 
through so called technology capability approach (Bell and Pavitt, 1992, Dahlman, Ross-
Larsen, and Westphal, 1987, Lall, 1992, Dutrenit, 2000).  Rich evidence at firm level has 
shown paths of upgrading of firms in developing countries through a variety of interrelated, 
sometimes similar and sometimes unique taxonomies. Based on Korean experience Kim 
(1980) has proposed a three-stage catch-up model of developing countries firms which goes 
from acquisition of foreign technology, to assimilation and then to implementation of new 
product lines. Hobday (1995) himself has explored the path of technology accumulation of 
East Asian electronics firms during the 1960-1990s. He shows that the best approximation of 
it is the inverse product life cycle. In contrast to R&D and design led strategies typical for 
technology leaders and followers east Asian latecomers have begun with minor 
improvements in manufacturing process and moved than in reverse towards mastering 
elements of process technology and only much later mastering elements of design 
capabilities.  
As some of these countries have been moving to a group of high-income economies the 
issue of firm upgrading have been approached as the issue of transition from catching up to 
post-catch up stages. When moving to post-catch up stage or to a level of high-income 
Types / Levels  Conceptual framework  
Intra firm level  -Reverse product life cycle: A combination of the 
product life cycle model in advanced firms by 
Utterback and Abernathy (1975) and Kim’s (1980) 
three stage catch-up model of Acquisition – 
Assimilation - Implementation 
- Importance of minor improvements during 
reverse learning trajectory (Hobday 1995, 1998, 
2004) 
Intra-industry and inter-
industry level 
-Industry life cycle and dominant design (Klepper, 
1993) 
 
-Upgrading towards high value-added industries 
(value chain upgrading) 
Country level  Sequential upgrading of countries based on 
‘leading-sector’ (Ozawa 2009) 
 
WEF rankings based on differing drivers of growth  
 
IUS innovation capacity of countries based on 
composite indicators of innovation activities 
economies countries are operating at technology frontier by solving problems that have not 
been solved by others. Unlike catch-up stage where firms enter largely through reverse 
product life cycle (PLC) pattern in the post-catch up stage shows firms entering in various 
stages of PLC (Choung et al, 2014). They can enter similar to reverse product life cycle from 
production to design and R&D via large firms; immediately after dominant design has been 
established to innovate among newly established system architecture via networks of new 
technology based firms or in early stages of new product life cycles via cooperation between 
public R&D organisations and firms (ibid). Along similar lines, there is also a “strategic niche” 
strategy, ‘which involves large number of public, private stakeholders through small-scale 
transition experiments that expand the scope of changes to a wider scale when the 
experiments succeed’ (Seong et al, 2014).  
 
A trend in literature has been expansion from firm level upgrading to ‘industry – level 
linkages’ or industry level upgrading. The underlying rationale for this is the realization that 
countries’ advancement of their firm-level upgrading is increasingly dependent on “industry 
linkages” (Ernst, 2008). More broadly Ernst (2008) talks about three forms of  “industrial 
upgrading”: (i) inter-industry upgrading from low value-added industries (e.g. light 
industries) to higher value-added industries (e.g. heavy and higher-tech industries); (ii) inter-
factor upgrading from endowed assets (i.e. natural resources and unskilled labour) to 
created assets (physical capital, skilled labour, social capital); and (iii) upgrading of demand 
within a hierarchy of consumption, from necessities to conveniences to luxury goods.  
 
How industries evolve and upgrade is much less understood. The most developed stylization 
of the dynamics of industry is the industry life cycle, which is either inseparable or quite 
reliant on already mentioned product life cycle (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). This view 
identifies identical three stages as in the evolution of product (Gort and Klepper 1982; 
Klepper and Graddy, 1990; Utterback and Suarez, 1992; Klepper, 1997). A radical innovation 
leads to product innovations. In this stage, entry barriers are low and R-D and capital 
requirements limited, new entrants are most often small firms. This is followed by the 
emergence of dominant design, which induces a stream of process innovations, but which 
also improves costs performance ratios. Economies of scale are increasing and equipment 
become standardised. This increases barriers to entry and lead to industry shakeouts. 
Finally, as technology matures a few incremental innovations are introduced, industry 
further concentrates while barriers to entry further increase.  Malerba and Orsenigo (1994) 
succinctly summarize weakness of these stylizations. First, industries are reduced to 
products, which is far too reductive. Second, the sequence of product innovations followed 
by process innovations does not hold in capital intensive industries such as commodity 
chemicals, synthetic fibers, plastics, petrochemicals where innovations are mainly of the 
process type. Third, in some industries the emergence of a dominant design can actually 
lead to the new discontinuity or to several dominant designs. Fourth, the radical product 
innovation that set in motion industry life cycle may be accompanied by very much different 
industry dynamics in terms of entrants, concentration and incumbents. Entrants may be the 
existing firms active in related industries while links among firms may continuously change 
and new type of actors emerging so that boundaries of industry are being continuously 
redefined. In a nutshell, there seems to be little that we can derive for our issue in terms of 
useful stylizations or regularities that can be used for our metrics of technology upgrading. 
Upgrading process does not seem to be correlated to either firm size, or type of innovation.  
 
A critique of industry life cycle models shows that industry boundaries are ill-defined and 
changing and need to include a variety of other non-business actors. This highlights the 
need for inclusion of infrastructure and infrastructural factor as an important factor in 
evolution and upgrading of industries and economies (see Ozawa, 2010)(see below).  
 
With the rise of composite indicators there has been proliferation of different attempts to 
measure progress at country level in terms of innovation and competiveness (see Archibugi 
et al, 2009 for discussion and overview). In a long-term historical perspective Ozawa (2009) 
depicts sequential upgrading of countries based on leading sectors. WEF GCR rankings 
depicts ranking of countries based on different drivers of economic growth classifying 
countries into factor, efficiency and innovation based. EU innovation Scoreboard depicts 
rankings based on composite indicator of innovation activities ranging from moderate to 
followers and innovation leaders. Among this group of models of upgrading it is necessary 
to mention indicator of economic complexity as a dimension by which it is possible to 
measure upgrading of different countries based on the complexity of their export products. 
See Hausman et al (2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2009).   
 
As highlighted in this section technology upgrading is a multi-level process and the ultimate 
pattern of upgrading at country level is a complex interaction between different levels – 
micro, mezzo and macro.  This perspective is the most widespread in the context of growth 
in East Asia and integration of its firms in global production networks. Aggregate 
explanations of growth have not been able to give satisfactory answers in how these 
economies managed to achieve upper middle-income status in such short period. Hence, 
industrial upgrading perspective has shown to be useful in shedding light on micro and 
mezzo level processes of technology accumulation and to give much richer accounts of 
drivers of growth than it was possible through variables like total factor productivity or 
institutions. 
 
In successful cases of catching up or forging ahead we observe high complementarity 
between different levels and various sub-systems which generate increasing returns 
(Freeman, 2002, Freeman and Louca, 2001). However, a favourable congruence between 
various sub-systems of society which have been favourable to economic growth in one 
period of technological development may not be so favourable when there are fundamental 
changes in technology (ibid). In short, history shows that technology upgrading is also 
institutional process and that these institutional requirements are also changing over time. 
However, for analytical conveniences we need to abstract from institutional set-ups and 
focus only on outcomes of the learning processes as detected through technology upgrading 
activities. Complexities of multi-level analysis at which technology accumulation takes place, 
diversity of its patterns as depicted through structural change as well as interactive nature 
of technology upgrading are sufficiently complex to justify our abstraction. Our fundamental 
assumption is firmly rooted in Schumpeterian theorizing both of formal type (Aghion, Akcigit 
and Howit, 2013) as well as of evolutionary and structuralist direction (Freeman and Louca, 
2001, Perez). It is assumption about the relationship between modes of technology 
upgrading and countries’ position in terms of level of development or distance of country 
from technology frontier.  We depict this in figure 1 which suggests that technology 
upgrading paths are different as economies moves from low to high incomes. When 
countries are far from technology distance they can grow based on imitative technology 
effort similar to logic explored by Lin (2012). As they move from middle to high income 
imitative technology efforts do not suffice for catching up so countries need to find 
alternative paths through technology diversification, not imitation of technology leaders 
(Lee, 2013). Once they reach post-catch stage they need to embark in activities on 
technology frontier.  
  
 
 
Figure 1: Different patterns of technology upgrading at different income levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From this follows that technology upgrading targets in countries that operate behind 
technology frontier should not necessarily draw from those that are suitable for high-
income countries. Structural differences including differences in levels of technology 
upgrading between countries should be taken into account when considering appropriate 
policies (see Radosevic and Kaderabkova, ed, 2011 for application of this thinking in the 
context of Eastern Europe). 
3. TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 
 
In this section we outline key criteria which need to be met to develop theory technology 
upgrading. We then outline conceptual approach which includes three dimensions of 
technology upgrading and its sub-components which hopefully could be used as the basis 
for building metrics of technology upgrading.  
 
3.1. CRITERIA FOR BUILDING THEORY OF TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING 
 
High income 
Middle income
Low income
Technology 
diversification 
Imitative 
technology effort
Technology 
frontier activities
We argue that theory of technology upgrading which is to be grounded in stylized facts of 
economic growth would need to meet the following criteria: 
 
1. A key to economic growth is in improved technology capability, which cannot be reduced 
to a single variable (Lee, 2013). Hence, this theory would need to be based on several 
drivers of technology capability. 
 
2. Technology upgrading is multidimensional process which consists of three major 
dimensions: technology, structural change and interaction with global economy.  
 
3. Technology upgrading is based on broader understanding of innovation, which goes well 
beyond R&D. 
 
4. As we already discussed technology upgrading is a multi-level process which is micro, 
mezzo and macro grounded. Technological change is never entirely aggregate or entirely 
micro-based but primarily process of structural change which takes place at micro, mezzo 
and macro levels. Lee (2012) takes this fully into account by exploring the issue of catching 
up at all three levels.  
 
5. At the core of technology upgrading is structural change which is also multi-dimensional 
process: technological, industrial, organisational 
 
6. Technology upgrading is also an outcome of interaction between global actors (embodied 
in international trade and investment flows) and local technology accumulation activities 
(pursued by host country firms and governments) (Ernst and Kim, 2002, Lall, 2003, Berend 
and Ranki, 1982). The key to catch-up and post-catch-up is leverage of domestic innovation 
efforts with global industrial or knowledge networks (Dieter 2008). Hence, magnitude of 
knowledge inflows and their coupling to domestic innovation efforts are key dimensions of 
technology upgrading (Yoruk 2013).  
 
It is important to bear in mind that usual term used is either ‘firm level upgrading’ or 
‘industry level upgrading’ while we talk about ‘technology upgrading’. Economic sectors are 
increasingly diverse conglomerates of technologies of different levels of complexities and 
their boundaries are often arbitrary especially in view of changing nature of industry and 
services (cf. tertiarisation of industry and industrialization of services). The notion of 
industry is always context specific and should not be reduced on statistical definition of 
industry at whichever level of aggregation. However, we also recognise that that there is 
degree of overlap between industry and technology upgrading as some industries are based 
on more complex technologies than others. In that respect, technology upgrading is about 
changes in technology intensity but equally about structural change. In fact, these two are 
inextricably linked as we argue below.  
 
Based on literature review and at very general level we conceptualise technology upgrading 
as a three-dimensional process (see figure 2).  It consists of dimension 1 (vertical axis) which 
is about intensity of technology upgrading as depicted by different types of innovation 
activities, of dimension 2 (horizontal axis) which is about spread or width of technology like 
diversity of technological knowledge, types of supporting infrastructure and firms’ structure 
as the carrier of technology upgrading, and of dimension 3 (diagonal axis) which depict 
knowledge inflows into economy through a variety of forms like trade, FDI and GVC. All 
three dimensions have strong grounding in the respective literatures on firm level 
technology upgrading, on structural change and growth, and on integration in global 
economy2.  
 
Figure 2: Dimensions of technology upgrading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Dimensions and components of technology upgrading 
 
                                                          
2
 We are fully aware that technology upgrading emerges through interaction between demand and supply 
factors. However, we consider that bringing demand upgrading into picture would bring another layer of 
complexity, which would make our conceptual framework unmanageable. 
• Production capability 
• Technology capability 
• R&D and knowledge intensity 
Intensity of 
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upgrading by types 
• Technology (embodied) imports 
• Knowledge imports 
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• Infrastructure (human, physical, organizational) 
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upgrading  
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Interaction with global economy 
3.2. INTENSITY AND TYPES OF TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING (SCALE) 
 
This dimension of upgrading is about acquiring different types of technology capabilities, 
which are also a reflection of different technological levels of economies. Economies that 
operate behind technology frontier are more likely to grow based on production capability, 
not technology capability while high-income economies are more likely to grow based on 
technology frontier (R&D based) activities.  
 
By making clear distinction towards industry upgrading and focusing on technology 
upgrading we can be in danger of focusing only on disembodied knowledge and technology. 
Given the diversity of forms in which technology is embodied, especially its embodiment in 
physical inputs and machinery this would be grave mistake. Moreover, innovation activities 
in latecomer economies are largely about adoption and improvements on imported 
machinery. Although, technology as stock of knowledge should be kept separate from 
production, technological capacities and production capacity are in reality strictly 
interconnected (Bell and Pavitt, 1993). In this respect we differ from Archibugi and Coco 
(2005) who abstract production from technological capability.  
 
Three types of capabilities, production capability, technology capability, R&D and knowledge 
intensity are present in all economies to different degrees. Their importance as drivers of 
growth varies in dependence of achieved income and technology levels as well as of the 
structural features of economies. Majcen et al (2009) and Kravtsova and Radosevic (2011) 
show that for Eastern Europe production capability was significant determinants of growth 
of productivity, both at micro and at macro levels. This is not unique feature of this region 
but more general feature of middle income economies as highlighted in figure 4 and by 
literature on technological capabilities cited earlier. The types of technology capabilities are 
depicted in figure below which is our reading of seminal piece by Amsden and Tschang 
(2003) on R&D indicators. 
 
Figure 4: From production capability to technology capability 
 
Source: Based on and adapted from Amsden and Tschang (2003)  
     key to productivity growth in MIC
Transition from engineering innovation to exploratory development
Transition from engineering innovation to advanced development
Transition from production to technology capability 
Basic research Applied research Exploratory development Advanced development
Process and product 
engineering Production capability
New knowedge for radically new 
marketable product
Differentiated product 'on 
paper' Prototype in a system
Prototype in 
manufacture
Improvements of existing 
products and processes 
Improved quality of products and 
processes
Own design manufacturers
Skilled  engineers Skilled technicians
                    Own brand manufacturers Original equipment manufacturers
PhD required with experience in R&D PhD not required/ MSc and BSc required
 
Based on figure 4 above we distinguish between production capability, process and product 
engineering capability, advanced and exploratory development, applied research, and basic 
research.  
 
Production capability is capability to produce at given level of technology at world levels of 
efficiency or productivity. This requires primarily good operational efficiency. The key 
workforce to operational efficiency is skilled technicians or blue-collar workers.  
A more complex capability is product and process engineering, which involves improvement 
in existing products and processes.  This capability is largely dependent on skilled engineers. 
A further stage of this capability is advanced development which Amsden and Tschang 
(2003) clearly distinguish from exploratory development. Advanced development is about 
prototype in manufacture while exploratory development is about prototype in a system. 
There is important threshold level of capability required for firms to move from advanced 
development, which is development for manufacture to own design manufacture. 
Production capability, process and product engineering, and advanced development are 
doable within OEM enterprises while exploratory development is a feature of ODM.  
 
These stages are not necessarily hierarchically structured –i.e. when moving from advanced 
to exploratory development or from exploratory development to applied research or from 
applied research to basic research does necessarily involve higher technology complexity 
(though it may) but simply qualitatively different set of technology or knowledge 
requirements. Equally, if not more important, upgrading to ’higher’ stages is not 
automatically more rewarding in terms of value added –i.e. upgrading may not necessarily 
lead to increased incomes but can simply be necessary to maintain the existing levels of 
income.  
Literature on technological capabilities has explored several cases of upgrading from 
production capability to design capability that can be considered paradigmatic. The best 
examples of this are cases from East Asia – a region that can be considered paragon of 
technology upgrading and catch-up. Taiwanese IT industry is a good example of progress 
from production to design capability in the period over 20-30 years (Ernst, 2013). Hobday et 
al (2004) explore the transformation of Korean firms from catch-up to post catch up stage. 
Also, Dutrenit (2000) provides an in-depth example of transformation from production to 
OBM world-class capability of the Mexican firm.  For Eastern Europe, Radosevic and Yoruk 
(2004) analyse transformation of ex-socialist electronics conglomerate into contract 
manufacturer.  
 
These paradigmatic examples show that technology upgrading is not linear and autonomous 
process but non-linear process with several thresholds levels in this process. A move from 
one to another stage is not guaranteed and requires a new set of technical, financial and 
organizational preconditions. Second, past successes are usually new sources of 
weaknesses, as dual strategies need to be pursued in move from one stage to another. For 
example, success in technology stage is based on low cost manufacturing capabilities and in 
capacity to follow technology leaders when introducing manufacturing of new products. A 
network on which such capability rests are not sufficient for the next stage which requires 
much more differentiated knowledge networks as well as much larger investment in R&D 
based developments and in marketing. Third, a reliance on GVC is the key to success in the 
first stages of production and technology capability. However, these become the major 
source of vulnerabilities, as technology leadership stage requires much more autonomous 
development, strong local technology demand and variety of specialized services and 
knowledge providers. 
 
3.2. BREADTH OF TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING: STRUCTURAL CHANGE, INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND FIRMS’ STRUCTURE (SCOPE) 
 
Technology upgrading cannot be reduced on intensity or scale of technological activities. Its 
additional dimension is breadth or scope of structural factors that affect intensity of 
technology upgrading. There are three structural factors: structural change itself, 
infrastructure (human, physical, organizational) and firms’ structure.  
 
3.2.1. Structural change 
There is not general theory of structural change but a variety of theoretical approaches of 
different methodological nature that aim to explain structural shifts between three broad 
sectors and among industries within these sectors (Krueger, 2008). There is a common 
understanding that technological changes affect structural change in the way that industries 
with relatively lower rates of productivity growth tend to shrink in terms of shares while 
those with higher rates of productivity growth expand. In this way structural change 
promote aggregate productivity growth even if we assume that within industries 
productivity growth remains stagnant. However, the empirical evidence on the role of 
structural change in aggregate productivity growth escapes broad generalisations and 
differs very much across different periods and countries or regions.  Structural change is 
often dominated by the within or intra-sectoral effects of productivity growth. Peneder 
(2003) concludes that structural change generates positive as well as negative contributions 
to aggregate productivity growth. However, since many of these effects net out, structural 
change on average appears to have only a weak impact. On the other hand, Sandven et al 
(2005) show that structural change within manufacturing in OECD countries is not a key 
feature of the growth process. Growth is primarily based on the internal transformation of 
low and medium tech sectors rather than on the creation of new sectors. For instance, the 
incorporation of ICT into medium or low-tech products is only one element of innovation in 
such sectors.  
 
The issue is complicated by the level at which structural change is observed. Jorgenson and 
Timmer (2011) show that the division of the economy among agriculture, industry, and 
services has lost most of its relevance.  There is a substantial heterogeneity within the 
services sector while the use of ICT capital and skilled labour is increasing in all sectors, in 
particular in the services industries. The linkages among industries and innovations including 
generic technologies like ICT permeate structural change. The empirical results do not 
support idea that growth is correlated with the shares of high tech sectors (Sandven et al, 
2005).  Instead, we observe the changing nature of industries and services and their 
convergence. This is being captured by knowledge intensive business services (KIBS) which 
are especially important in this development.3 Their importance as sources of innovation, 
technologies and inputs has increased steadily over time. As a consequence, linkages 
between KIBS and manufacturing industries in different countries have strengthened over 
time.  
 
Another structural change is the increasing importance of knowledge in all economic 
activities which is being captured by Knowledge Intensive Activities (KIA) which are defined 
as economic sectors in which more than 33 % of the employed labour force have completed 
academic-oriented tertiary education (i.e. at ISCED 5 and 6 levels)(ECR 2011).  
 
Imbis and Wacziarg (2003 have found out that sectoral concentration follows a U-shaped 
pattern in relation to per capita income. As a result, the increased sectoral specialization 
applies only to high-income economies. Countries diversify over most of their development 
path (p.64). This fact is quite in line with robust finding about growth and structural change 
by Lee (2012) who shows that technology diversification is an important and robust feature 
of growth from middle to high incomes.   
 
In summary, despite recognising importance of structural change we can derive very little in 
the way of importance of different sectors and industries in economic growth. The whole 
point of structural change driven by technology is that it changes boundaries of industries as 
well as the nature of industries. Hence, using high tech, as proxy of structural change would 
be highly misleading as high-tech elements permeate many low-tech sectors. Also, catching-
up countries are involved increasingly in high tech industries but at low value added 
segments. So, instead of being focused on structural changes at the level of industries we 
prefer to focus on more reliable trends regarding technological changes. By this we mean 
primarily: the increasing importance of ICT in all sectors and activities in economy; the 
increasing importance of convergence between manufacturing and services as being 
captured by KIBS; an increasing knowledge intensity of all sectors of economy as captured 
by KIA indicator; and increasing technology diversification as countries upgrade 
technologically (see table 2). 
 
Table 3: Components of structural factors of technology upgrading 
                                                          
3
 KIBS are defined according to the NACE classification, NACE REV 1.1. as including the categories computer 
and related activities (NACE 72), research and development (NACE 73) and other business activities (NACE 74). 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2. Infrastructural upgrading 
 
Technology upgrading is primarily taking place in firms but it is not only-firm level business. 
The accumulation of technology capability in firms must be accompanied by an 
organizational and institutional infrastructure that supports the acquisition of such 
capabilities. Choung et al (2014) show that transition from the adoption (catching-up) to the 
creation stage (post-catch-up) depends on the range of infrastructures that support 
innovation in a country, in addition to the strategy and resources of a single company. We 
consider infrastructure to be an important dimension of structural change.  
Infrastructure is one component of an economy’s endowments, which generates large 
externalities to other firms’ transaction costs. It is both public good and an input in the 
production of other intermediate inputs. Access to infrastructure services is strongly 
correlated with a country’s average income. Infrastructure matters but the evidence does 
not provide an unequivocal argument in favour of more or less infrastructure investment 
(Prud’homme, 2005). Still, despite the obvious problems estimating the direction of 
causation between infrastructure investment and growth, the evidence suggests that 
infrastructure causes growth which in turn causes greater demand for (and supply of) 
infrastructure. As countries reach certain stages of economic development the extent to 
which infrastructure may represent a binding constraint on development changes.   
  
  
  
S t r u c t u r a l   c h a n g e s   
w h i c h   p r o m o t e   
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K n o w l e d g e   i n t e n s i v e   b u s i n e s s   s e r v i c e s   ( K I B s )   
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F i r m s ’   s t r u c t u r e   S h a r e   o f   l a r g e  f i r m s   
S h a r e   o f   S M E s   
Human capital is important driver of growth (Glaeser et al, 2004). A technology embodied in 
new machinery and equipment will not by itself lead to increased productivity unless there 
are human skills to effectively use it. A human capital acquired through education is an 
infrastructural precondition or input into technology upgrading. In addition to school 
attainments and years of schooling differences in learning achievements matter even more 
in explaining cross-country differences in produc vity growth ( anushek and   mann, 
2007). In long run growth is closely related to the level of cognitive skills of the population 
(Hanushek, 2013). In short, evidence regarding ‘quantity’ and quality of human capital 
supports its inclusion as important structural component. 
 
However, in order to be effective human skills need to be part of a specific organisational 
and economic process that rewards dexterity, learning and innovation. So, human skills 
unless converted into firm specific skills will not suffice for technology upgrading. Eastern 
Europe is good example of a region whose labour force post-1989 had relatively high 
education levels but also low firm specific skills. In post-1989 this has been considered as 
great advantage and in a few cases led to domestic innovations but with meagre economic 
results. A good example is Estonian ICT industry (see Hogselius, 2005) which has generated 
several innovations in IT services. However, a careful examination of this case shows that 
individual competencies alone are not sufficient without firm specific organisational 
capabilities. The inherited competencies are strongest at the level of individuals but this is 
not enough to develop dynamic innovation system without organisational capabilities within 
which individual competencies can be harnessed. Estonian ICT sector has developed 
customized innovations, which by definition are not directly transferable to other contexts. 
These product innovations are easy to imitate or their innovation is in service provision 
rather than in any unique firm specific accumulated technological competencies. Weak 
organisational capabilities were further reinforced through marketing barriers to export. 
Another example is inherited skills in electronics in ten socialist era electronics 
conglomerates. Only in one case these skills were preserved largely due to organisational 
capabilities and strategies of top management (see Radosevic and Yoruk, 2004). In all other 
cases, similar labour force skills were not employed in productive context, which would 
develop new organisational capabilities within which human capital could be successfully 
deployed.  
 
Much more known case is of the Indian software whose success is usually attributed to 
individuals. Indeed, competition by MNEs in labour markets (not competition on product 
markets) has induced productive efficiency among domestic firms. However, key to use of 
human capital were organisational capabilities of Indian software firms which were building 
through imitation and which harnessed to productive use skilled labour force (Athreye, 
2005). This leads to the next important structural factor: firms structure.  
 
3.2.3. Firms’ structure  
 
Schumpeterian economics emphasizes firms’ heterogeneity as one of the essential features 
of industry dynamics (Nelson and Winter, 1985). One aspect of heterogeneity is size 
differences or the roe of large vs small firms in technology upgrading.  The views on the role 
of large vs. small firms have been quite divided. Chandler (1994) is the most known account 
of the importance of big business in growth of economy. ith advent of ‘third industrial 
revolution’ and globalization the view emerged that ‘the Chandlerian firm is under siege 
from a panoply of decentralized and market-like forms that often resemble some of the 
“inferior” nineteenth-century structures the managerial enterprise replaced’ (Langlois, 
2003).On the hand, there is increasing evidence that globalization has actually reinforced 
the importance of big businesses. Despite the new institutional framework which gives 
prominence to markets and networks, global enterprises have remained the major players 
on global markets. It is true that new paradigm has significantly influenced both the firm 
boundaries and the patterns of inter-organizational division of labour but the roles of the 
“visible hand” of organizations and the relative competitive advantages of size such have 
remained (Dosi et al, 2008). Lee et al. (2013) is so far the most grounded confirmation that 
there is a significant and robust relationship between the number or sales of big businesses, 
such as of Fortune 500 firms, and national economic growth even after controlling for 
country size or endogeneity. They show that among latecomer economies China and Korea, 
have more big businesses than predicted by country size, whereas other middle-income 
countries have fewer big businesses than predicted by their sizes, while many high-income 
countries stay above it. In line with this IFC (2013) survey data show that share of large firms 
in employment is larger in high income and upper middle income economies when 
compared to lower income groups. The evidence for the role of SMEs is surprisingly also 
weaker. Beck et al. (2005) find certain positive but weak correlations between SMEs growth 
and per capita income without controlling for endogeneity and no significance when 
endogeneity is controlled. 
As organisational capabilities are by definition more complex and more developed in large 
firms the firms’ structure is an important factor of technology upgrading. Based on evidence 
we formulate working hypothesis that share of large firms is conducive factor of technology 
upgrading given other things equal. 
 
 
3.3. INTERACTION WITH GLOBAL ECONOMY FOR TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING 
 
A successful technology upgrading is never entirely autonomous process but is always linked 
to inflow of foreign knowledge skills, which are coupled with intensive domestic technology 
effort (Radosevic, 1999). A literature that documents that is far too lengthy and only a few 
examples will suffice to reiterate this robust but often forgotten stylized fact (Mowery and 
Oxley, 1997, Kim 1997, Amsden 2001). The emphasis is usually on one of these two 
elements of catching up – either on domestic technology accumulation or on inflows of 
foreign knowledge through trade, FDI and generally open economic regime.  
 
Literature on FDI and technology upgrading or knowledge spillovers is quite numerous. A 
meta-review of this literature by Bruno and Campos (2013) shows that the effect of FDI on 
economic performance and growth are conditional. Firms, sectors or countries that are 
below certain “thresholds” (either in terms of human capital, financial development or 
institutional quality) are less likely to benefit from FDI. In overall, benefits are significantly 
greater in low-income than in lower and upper middle-income countries (both at the micro 
and macro level). Available data provide stronger support for differentiating the effect of 
FDI on growth across levels of development rather than in terms of geographic regions.  
The effect at the macro level depend upon whether recipient countries have attained 
minimum levels of human capital, financial and institutional development. The effects of FDI 
using firm-level data tend to find that the (micro-) effect is conditional upon the type of 
linkages (with backward linkages, that is, links between the firm and its suppliers, 
dominating over horizontal or forward linkages). 
 
Indeed, FDI is a potential source of technology upgrading.  Integration into the global 
economy and foreign direct investment (FDI) can act as important catalysts for change but 
equally FDI alone are not driver of technology upgrading. As literature suggest their effects 
on upgrading are highly differentiated and dependent on indigenous technology effort. Even 
when countries are integrated globally in R&D networks they do not necessarily link up with 
domestic manufacturing value chain which lead to what Ernst (2014) describes on the 
example of Indian electronics as ‘truncation of FDI based learning’.  e explains this by 
fragmented Indian national innovation system in which local electronics manufacturing 
remains disconnected from India‘s chip-design capabilities which are integrated, instead, 
into global networks of innovation and production.  
 
FDI indicators are of limited value in detecting the true knowledge that is acquired through 
international industrial networks. Research on GVC is useful in that respect though it is 
difficult to generalise. Different contributions show the positive and significant effects of 
learning through value chains on process, product and functional upgrading up to ODM 
level.  Yoruk (2013) shows the major importance of both knowledge and production 
networks for firms’ upgrading but also that is highly misleading to narrowing learning 
opportunities for upgrading to interactions with the global buyers within GVCs.  Her 
research in the case of Eastern Europe shows that learning by doing and learning by 
exporting do not have statistically significant effect on functional upgrading. She shows that 
opportunities offered by GVCs will be of little use unless firms have ability to internalise this 
external knowledge through its human resources, through training and research within the 
firm. She also shows that managerial upgrading is important to technology upgrading but 
global buyers do not support it. This again highlights the importance of organisational 
capabilities or firms’ structure that we discussed under structural dimension of technology 
upgrading.  
 
Globalisation of technology exploitation and collaboration but also technology generation 
through globalization of R&D process has further increased the importance of international 
linkages for industrial upgrading (UNCTAD,2005). A very recent example of the importance 
of integration into global value chains and its growth benefits is German – Central European 
supply chain cluster (GCESC)(IMF 2013, IMF 2013b). The increase in foreign value added in 
four major countries locations of GCESC (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary/CE4) 
appears to have led to increases in domestic value added through productivity increases as 
well as by creating demand for ancillary products and services in host economies. It seems 
that participation in the GCESC has led to considerable technology transfers to the CE4 
countries though there is not yet clear consensus about its magnitude due to high 
heterogeneity among firms in terms of fostering skills.  
 
The weakness of many technologies upgrading metrices is that they are focused on explicit 
domestic technology effort or import of knowledge via licences but neglect knowledge 
inflows in embodied form via imported inputs and equipment. In countries behind 
technology frontier growth is mainly driven by diffusion and absorption of technologies that 
are new to the firm or country but not new to the world. Domestic knowledge generation in 
business enterprises sector through R&D or non–R&D technical activities as well as 
accumulation of knowledge in public R&D system is not yet the major driver of growth when 
compared to indirect knowledge and R&D embodied in imported inputs and machinery. 
R&D activity performed in industries other than the one where own R&D is being carried out 
have a significant effect on productivity growth. Own-R&D activity accounts for about one-
half of the total R&D content in countries at the technological frontier, and between one-
quarter and one-half of the total R&D content in countries below the frontier (Knell, 2008).  
Finally, mobility of people is one of the most effective channels of knowledge transfer and 
of technology upgrading.  This is the key mechanism for conveying tacit knowledge as well 
as initiator of learning.  
Out of three dimensions of technology upgrading the interaction with global economy is 
probably the most difficult to capture since technology transfer happens through capital 
equipment import, is embedded in modes like FD, networks and subcontracting or is 
disembodied (licences). However, modes of transfer by themselves cannot be taken as 
proxies of the real knowledge transfer that has taken place (Radosevic, 1999). In view of 
that complexity we consider distinction between technologies (embodied) imports, 
knowledge imports (licences) and knowledge cooperation (RD cooperation) as components 
of interaction with the global economy dimension which are distinctive but are also possible 
to capture through data.  
  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We argued in this paper that we need theory and metrics of technology upgrading for the 
following reasons.  First, aggregate theories of growth are not useful and represent a kind of 
‘holy grail’ of growth theory. Second, current metrices of technology upgrading are either 
atheoretical or are not useful for countries behind technology frontier. Third, such metrices 
lead to misleading or irrelevant policies. Hence, there is a need to generate theoretically 
relevant but empirically grounded middle level conceptual and statistical framework which 
could illuminate a type of challenges which are relevant for a large number of economies at 
different levels of income.  
We have reviewed literature relevant to this idea and have derived conceptual framework 
which we consider as useful way to approach to theory and metrics of technology 
upgrading. In nutshell, we conceptualize technology upgrading as three dimensional 
processes composed of the following dimensions: Intensity and different types of 
technology upgrading through various types of innovation and technology activities; a 
widening (broadening) of technology upgrading through different forms of technology and 
knowledge diversification, and interaction with the global economy through different forms 
of knowledge import, adoption and exchange. We discussed each of these dimensions in 
some detail pointing to their major components and justifying why they are important to 
our understanding of each of three dimensions of technology upgrading. We consider this to 
be necessary first step towards theory and metrics of technology upgrading and generation 
of relevant composite indicator for technology upgrading of countries at different levels of 
income.  
 
REFERENCES 
1. Abernathy, W.J. and Utterback, J.M. (1978) Patterns of Industrial Innovation. Technology 
Review.vol.8, iss.7, p.40-47. 
2. Acemoglu, Daron, Fabrizio Zilibotti and Philippe Aghion (2006)  Journal of the European Economic 
Association, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Mar., 2006), pp. 37-74 
3. Akamatsu K.(1962): A historical pattern of economic growth in developing countries. Journal of 
Developing Economies, 1(1):3–25, March–August. 
4. Archibugi Daniele and Alberto Coco (2005) Measuring technological capabilities at the country 
level: A survey and a menu for choice, Research Policy 34 (2005) 175–194 
5. Archibugi, D., Denni, M. and Filippetti, A. (2009) ‘The technological capabilities of nations: A 
review of the synthetic indicators’. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 76, No. 7, pp. 
917-31. 
6. Amsden  Alice H. and F. Ted Tschang (2003) A new approach to assessing the technological 
complexity of different categories of R&D (with examples from Singapore), Research Policy 32 (2003) 
553–572 
7. Amsden, Alice  . (2001) The Rise Of ‘‘The Rest’’. Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing 
Economies, Oxford University Press.  
8. Aghion, Philippe, Ufuk Akcigit and Peter Howitt (2013) What Do We Learn From Schumpeterian 
Growth Theory? NBER Working Paper Series No 18824, February 
9. Athreye, Suma (2005) “The Indian Software industry and its evolving service capability”; Industrial 
and Corporate Change, Vol. 14(3): 393-418. 
10. Beck T. Demirguc_Kunt A, Levine R (2005) SMEs, growth and poverty: Cross-country evidence, 
Journal of Economic Growth, 10(3):199-229. 
11. Bell, M. and K. Pavitt (1993) “Technological Accumulation and Industrial Growth: Contrasts 
between developed and developing countries”, Industrial and Corporate Change, 2(2): 157-210. 
12. Bell, Martin and Keith Pavitt (1997) Technological accumulation and industrial growth: contrasts 
between developed and developing countries, in  Daniele Archibugi, Jonathan Michie, (eds), 
Technology, Globalisation and Economic Performance,  
13. Berend Iván T. and György Ránki (1982) The European Periphery and Industrialization, 1780–
1914, New York: Cambridge University Press 
14. Bruno Randolph L. and Nauro F. Campos (2013) Reexamining the Conditional Effect of Foreign 
Direct Investment, IZA Discussion Paper No. 7458, June 2013.  Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2287068 
15. Bruno, R., E. Douarin, J. Koosteleva and S. Radosevic (forthcoming) Technology Choices and 
Growth: Testing New Structural Economics in Transition Economies, Journal of Economic Policy 
Reform.  
16. Chenery Hollis and Moises Syrquin (1975), Patterns  of development, 1950-1970, (World Bank) 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
17. Chandler, Alfred D. Jr (1994) Scale and Scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, Harvard 
University Press.   
18. Choung,  Jae-Yong, Hye-Ran Hwang and Wichin Song (2014) Transitions of Innovation Activities in 
Latecomer Countries: An Exploratory Case Study of South Korea,  World Development Vol. 54, pp. 
156–167, 2014 
19. Crépon, B., E. Duguet and J. Mairesse (1998), “Research and Development, Innovation and 
Productivity: An Econometric Analysis at the Firm Level”, Economics of Innovation and New 
Technology, 7(2), 115-158. 
20. Dahlman, C., Ross-Larsen, B. and Westphal, L.E. (1987), Managing technological development: 
Lessons from the Newly Industrializing Countries, World Development, Vol.15, No. 6, 759-775. 
21. Dosi, Giovanni, Alfonso Gambardella, Marco Grazzi, Luigi Orsenigo (2008) Technological 
Revolutions and the Evolution of Industrial Structures: Assessing the Impact of New Technologies 
upon the Size and Boundaries of Firms, Capitalism and Society,  Volume 3, Issue 1 2008 Article 6:1-47 
22. Dutrenit, Gabriela (2000) Learning and Knowledge Management in the Firm: from Knowledge 
Accumulation to Strategic Capabilities, Edward Elgar: Aldershot, England. 
23. Easterly, William (2001) The Elusive Quest for Growth. Economists’ Adventures and 
Misadventures in the Tropics, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.  
24. Ernst Dieter (2014) Upgrading India's electronics manufacturing industry : regulatory reform and 
industrial policy, East West Centre, Honolulu, 
25. Ernst, Dieter (2008) Asia’s “upgrading through innovation” strategies and global innovation 
networks: an extension of Sanjaya Lall’s research agenda, Transnational Corporations, Volume 17, 
Number 3, December 2008 
26. Ernst, D. (1998) “Catching-Up, Crisis and Industrial Upgrading. Evolutionary Aspects of 
Technological Learning in Korea`s Electronics Industry “, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Volume 
15 (2): 247-283. 
 27. Ernst, D. (2001) “Global Production networks and Industrial Upgrading – A Knowledge Centred 
Approach”, East-West Center Working Papers, Economics Series, No. 25. 
28. Ernst Dieter (2013) Industrial Upgrading through Low-Cost and Fast Innovation— Taiwan’s 
Experience, East-West Center working paper, Honolulu, Economics Series, No. 133, September 2013 
29. Ernst, D. and Kim, L. (2002) Global production networks, knowledge diffusion and local capability 
formation. Research Policy, 31: 1417-29. 
30. Ernst, D. (2008) “Can Chinese IT Firms Develop Innovative Capabilities ithin Global Knowledge 
Networks?”, East-West Center Working Papers, Economics Series, 94. 
 31. Ernst, D. (1997) “From Partial to Systemic Globalization: International Production Networks in 
the Electronics Industry”, BRIE orking Paper 98. 
32. European Competitiveness Report 2011, Chapter 2  ‘Convergence of knowledge intensive sectors 
and the EU’s external competitiveness’ (further ECR 2011) 
33. Foray, Dominique (2015), Smart specialization. Opportunities and challenges for regional 
innovation policy, Routledge.  
34. Freeman, Chris (2002) Continental, national and sub national innovation systems – 
complementarity and economic growth, Research Policy 31: 191-211. 
 35. Freeman Chris and Francisco Louçã (2001) As Time Goes By From the Industrial Revolutions to 
the Information Revolution, Oxford University Press.  
36. Furman Jeffrey L. and Richard Hayes (2004) Catching up or standing still? National innovative 
productivity among ‘follower’ countries, 1978–1999 Research Policy 33 (2004) 1329–1354 
37. Gort Michael and Steve Klepper (1982) Time Paths in the Diffusion of Product Innovations, The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 92, No. 367 (Sep., 1982), pp. 630-653 
38. Glaeser, Edward L., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer. "Do 
Institutions Cause Growth?," Journal of Economic Growth, 2004, v9(3,Sep), 271-303. 
39.  anushek Eric A. and Ludger   mann (2007) Education Quality and Economic Growth, World 
Bank, Washington. 
40. Hanushek, E., Economic Growth in Developing Countries: The Role of Human Capital, Economics 
of Education Review (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2013.04.005 
41. Hobday, M., H. Rush., J. Bessant (2004) Approaching the innovation frontier in Korea: the 
transition phase to leadership, Research Policy 33:1433-1457. 
42. Hogselius, Per The (2005) Dynamics of Innovation in Eastern Europe: Lessons from Estonia, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 
43.  obday, M. (1995) “East Asian Latecomer Firms: Learning the Technology of Electronics, orld 
Development, 23(7): 1171-1193. 
44.  umphrey, J. and Schmitz,  . (2004) ’Governance in global value chains’, in  . Schmitz (ed.) Local 
Enterprises in the Global Economy. Issues of Governance and Upgrading, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 
UK, 95-109. 
45. Hausmann, R., J. Hwang, and D. Rodrik. 2007a. “ hat You Export Matters.” Journal of Economic 
Growth 12:1-25. 
46.  ausmann, R. and B. Klinger. 2006. “Structural Transformation and Patterns of Comparative 
Advantage.” CID orking Paper No. 128. Cambridge, MA: Center for International Development, 
Harvard University. 
47.  idalgo, C., and R.  ausmann. 2009. “The Building Blocks of Economic Complexity.” Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences 106(26): 10570–10575. 
48.  idalgo, C., B. Klinger, A. L. Barabasi, and R.  ausmann. 2007b. “The Product Space Conditions 
the Development of Nations.” Science 317: 482-487. 
49. Imbis Jean and Roman Wacziarg, Stages of diversification, American Economic Review 2003. Vol. 
93, No. 1, pp. 63-86. 
50. IMF (2013)  “German-Central European Supply Chain-Cluster Report”, IMF Country Report 
13/263, August 20th, 2013 
51. IMF (2013b) Trade Linkages, Balance Sheets, and Spillovers: The Germany-Central European 
Supply Chain, Prepared by Selim Elekdag and Dirk Muir, IMF Working Paper, European Department, 
October 2013 
52. Jorgenson Dale W. and Marcel P. Timmer (2011) Structural Change in Advanced Nations: A New 
Set of Stylised Facts, Scand. J. of Economics 113(1), 1–29, 2011 
53. Kim, L. (1980) Stages of development of industrial technology in a less developed country: a 
model, Research Policy 9(3):254-277 
54. Kim, L. (1997) Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea's Technological Learning, Boston, 
Harvard Business School Press. 
55. Knell Mark (2008) Product-Embodied Technological Diffusion and Intersectoral Linkages in 
Europe, 28 April, Innovation Watch – SYSTEMATIC, NIFUSTEP 
56. Kuznets, S. (1930) Secular Movements in Production and Prices: Their nature and their bearing 
upon cyclical fluctuations. Houghton Mifflin, Boston and New York, repr. Kelley, New York, 1967. 
57. Lall, S. (1992), Technological capabilities and industrialization, Research Policy, Vol. 20, No. 2, 
165-186 
58. Langlois Richard N.(2003) Chandler in a Larger Frame: Markets, Transaction Costs, and 
Organizational Form in History, Business and Economic History, Vol.1 (On line) 
http://www.thebhc.org/publications/BEHonline/2003/Langlois.pdf 
59. Lee Keun, B Y Km, Y Y Park, E Sanidas (2013) Big business and economic growth: identifying a 
binding constraint  for growth with country panel analysis, Journal of Comparative Economics, 41 
(2):561-82 
60. Lee, Keun (2013) Schumpeterian analysis of economic catch-up, Knowledge, Path-creation and 
the middle-income trap, Cambridge University Press. .  
61. Lin Justin Yifu (2011) From Flying Geese to Leading Dragons New Opportunities and Strategies for 
Structural Transformation in Developing Countries, Policy Research Working Paper 5702, World Bank  
62. Lin Justin Yifu (2012a) From Flying Geese To Leading Dragons: New Opportunities and Strategies 
for Structural Transformation in Developing Countries, Global Policy Volume 3 . Issue 4 . November 
2012: 397-407 
63. Lin, Justin Yifu (2012b) New Structural Economics. A Framework for Rethinking Development and 
Policy. The World Bank, Washington D.C. 
64. Lin Justin Yifu & David Rosenblatt (2012c): Shifting patterns of economic growth and rethinking 
development, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 15:3, 171-194 
65. Majcen, Boris, Slavo Radosevic, Matija Rojec (2009) Nature and determinants of productivity 
growth of foreign subsidiaries in Central and East European countries, Economic Systems,  33 (2009) 
168–184 
66. Marshall, A. (1890) Principles of Economics. C.W. Guillebaud (ed), 9th edn, vol.1, 
Macmillan/Royal Economic Society, London, 1961.  
67. Mowery, D.C. and J. Oxley (1997) “Inward Technology Transfer and Competitiveness: The Role of 
National Innovation Systems”, in Technology, Globalisation and Economic Performance, D. Archibugi 
and J. Michie (eds.), Cambridge University Press.  
68. Nelson Richard R. and Sidney G. Winter (1985), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 
Belknap Press.  
69. Klepper, S. and E. Graddy (1990), The Evolution of New Industries and the Determinants of 
Marke Structure,' Rand Journal of Economics, 21, 27—44 
70. Klepper, Steven (1997) Industry Life Cycles, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol., 6, No.1: 145-
181.  
71. Kravtsova,V.  and Radosevic,S. (2011) Are systems of innovation in Eastern Europe efficient? 
Economic Systems, doi:10.1016/j.ecosys.2011.04.005 
72. Krueger, Jens J. (2008) Productivity and structural change: a review of the literature, Journal of 
Economic Surveys (2008) Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 330–363 
73. Malerba Franco and Luigi Orsenigo (1994) The Dynamics and Evolution of Industries, Working 
Paper WP-94- 120,  November 1994, The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
74. Ozawa, Terutomo (2009) The Rise of Asia, The ‘Flying Geese’ theory of tandem growth and 
regional agglomeration, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.   
75. Peneder Michael (2003), Industrial structure and aggregate growth, Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics, 14 (2003): 427-448 
76. Perez Carlota (2010) Technological revolutions and techno-economic paradigms, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 34: 185–202 
77. Prud’homme, Rémy. 2005. « Infrastructure and Development», in: Bourguignon, François & Boris 
Pleskovic, ed. 2005. Lessons of Experience (Proceedings of the 2004 Annual Bank conference on 
Development Economics). Washington: The World Bank and Oxford University Press, pp. 153-181. 
78. Radelet, Steven and Jeffrey Sachs (1997) Asia’s Re-emergence, Foreign Affairs, 
November/December  
79. Radosevic, S. (1999) International technology transfer and catch-up in economic development, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.  
80. Radosevic, S. and D. E. Yoruk, ‘The growth of enterprise through entrepreneurship and network 
alignment’, In Radosevic, S. and B. Sadowski (Eds.)(2004), International industrial networks and 
industrial restructuring in central Europe, Russia and Ukraine, Kluwer, 2004, pp.109-130 
81. Radosevic Slavo and Anna Kaderabkova (eds) (2011) Challenges for European Innovation Policy: 
Cohesion and Excellence from a Schumpeterian Perspective, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 
82. Radosevic, S. and Yoruk, D.E. 2004, “The Growth of Enterprise Through  Entrepreneurship and 
Network Alignment” in S. Radosevic and B.M. Sadowski (eds), International Industrial Networks and 
Industrial Restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe, Kluwer, Dordrecht, the Netherlands. 
83. Rostow, W.W. (1960) The stages of economic growth: A non-communist manifest. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge; 2nd enlarged edn, 1971.  
84. Seong, Jieun, Jongseon Kim and Yejin Cho (2014) Korea’s Post Catch-up Policy Experiment: 
Focusing on the Transition towards a Sustainable Socio-technical System, Paper prepared for 
thematic issue of AJTM 
85. Sandven, Tore, Keith Smith and Aris Kaloudis (2005),  Structural change, growth and innovation: 
the roles of medium and low tech industries, 1980-2000, In H. Kreinsen et al (eds), Low-tech 
Innovation in the Knowledge Economy, Frankfurt: P. Lane. Jan 29 2005 
86. Suarez Fernando and James Utterback (1995) Dominant designs and the survival of firms, 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 16, 415-430.  
87. Yoruk, D.E. (2013) Firm-level upgrading in low- and medium-technology industries in emerging 
markets: the role of learning networks, PhD thesis, University of Sussex, December, SPRU.  
88. UNCTAD (2005) World Investment Report, UN, Geneva 
89. Von Tunzelmann, G.N. (1995) Technology and Industrial Progress: The Foundations of Economic 
Growth, Edward Elgar, Aldershot 
 
 
 
